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THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY BEHIND AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU
ECONOMIC AIR TRANSPORT POLICY AND OTHER POLICIES WHICH
AFFECT IT
(F. Sørensen)
A. Introduction
The European Communities were created in 1958 by the Treaty of Rome. Its institutions should
guarantee that coherent decisions are taken, implemented and legally enforced in all Member States.
Its general rules include, inter alia, provisions on right of establishment, freedom to provide services,
competition, state aids and approximation of legislation. However, the Treaty included Article 84,
which in its paragraph 2 stated that the Council could take any appropriate decision as to policy for air
and sea transport. This was in contrast to what was stated in respect of the other modes of transport.
On that basis practically everybody in air transport thought that until such a decision was taken air
transport was excluded from Treaty provisions. Consequently while policy was developed for other
modes of transport nothing happened in air transport until 1974. In this year the European Court of
Justice took a decision concerning the application of social rules in the maritime sector. In this context
the Court stated, contrary to the general belief, that the general provisions of the Treaty did apply to
sea and air transport and that the exclusion contained in Article 84 only applied to the provisions
contained in the transport chapter. It took some time for the Member States to get over the shock but in
1978 they had become convinced that an application of the general principles of the Treaty without
attention being given to the specific characteristics of air transport would be too dangerous. They were
also to some extent under the impression of the US deregulation, which came into effect in 1978.
Therefore, a priority list for air transport was approved1 in 1978 by the Council. This was followed up
in 1979 by a memorandum (the first) on air transport (A Community Approach) issued by the
Commission.
This was the start to a process where the European Union in the course of a number of years (14)
developed an economic air transport policy for its internal market. This policy introduced, step by
step, not only a liberal system but also safeguards and harmonization measures with a view to permit
time for adaptation and to achieve a level playing field. As a consequence, essential provisions
included in the bilateral agreements between the twelve Member States were therefore automatically
replaced. This development is described in the following and also illustrated in annex 1. The
liberalisation concerned the scheduled air transport but ultimately all types of air carriers were
covered.
B. Past liberalization measures
Inter-regional Air Services
After a detailed and extensive discussion, which started in 1980, agreement was reached in 1983 on a
limited policy initiative, in the form of a directive on inter-regional air services (No. 8 on the priority
list).
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The initiative was intended as a first experiment and the scope of the text, therefore, was rather
cautious covering only air services between regional airports. Account was taken of an ECAC2 study
(Compas report), which underlined that a competitive environment would be seriously impaired unless
provisions on market access, capacity and air fares would all be made more liberal. This document had
a very important effect because it convinced the middle management in the national administrations
that liberalisation had to come and that action had to be taken in all three areas. The resistance to this
development came from most of the Directors General of Civil Aviation (incl. DK). The Netherlands
and the UK supported the initiative very strongly. The resistance from the national air carriers was
muted since the initiative was so limited.
The directive opened market access for scheduled air services between all regional airports for any
Community air carrier designated by its Home State and capacity control was relaxed completely.
With regard to air fares, the principle was adopted that they had to be viewed in the light of the air
carrier's own costs and not against any kind of industry average which had been the approach until
then. In fact if an air carrier could demonstrate that a proposed air fare was reasonable in the light of
the air carrier’s own costs then it would have to be approved by the responsible authorities.
Restrictions were included. In particular the Home States maintained their discretionary powers to
designate or not their air carriers. Furthermore, receiving States were not obliged to accept multiple
designation by other Member States and could refuse to authorize services by other European Union
carriers on routes where a reasonable indirect service already existed. Only aircraft of up to 70 seats
could be used.
In view of the above limitations it is not surprising that, while new activity resulted from this
policy, no “dangerous” developments took place. On the other hand it should be remembered
that Maersk Air used this Directive as a starting point and established a scheduled service
between Billund and London by in fact mislabelling Southend airport. Officially Denmark was
rather horrified about this misuse of the Directive. However, the Directive created a belief
among regional air carriers, that if they wanted to they could easily enter new markets. When
the first package was approved they therefore began to really take advantage of the new
framework.
First Package
The Directive on interregional air services was followed up by the Commission with a rather cautious
second memorandum, which suggested further steps in respect of capacity control and air fares only
with no proposal in respect of market access. These proposals were to be applied to the bilateral
agreements between Member States. During the discussion in the Council of Ministers this cautious
approach was rejected under the influence of the COMPAS report. Market access provisions was
added and the approach was changed to that of the interregional air services Directive i.e. that the
clauses would take precedence over similar clauses in the bilateral agreements.
Furthermore, after 1983 the pressure on the air transport industry and the Member States increased,
basically because it became evident to the Commission that the situation existing at the time could not
be accepted under the competition rules of the Treaty. In fact the Commission started a fact finding
activity in respect of agreements between air carriers which might be contrary to Article 853 of the
Treaty. On this basis and at the instigation of Commissioner Sutherland the Commission therefore
declared in 1986 that all co-operation between airlines would have to stop unless a more liberal market
framework would be decided by the Council.
Agreement on a set of Regulations was reached in 1987 to extend the liberalization policy to
scheduled services between regional4 and main airports, thus opening the possibility to Member States
to designate air carriers for 3rd, 4th and consecutive 5th freedom services between these airports and
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the receiving states would have to accept this designation. Multiple designation was introduced
depending on the level of traffic and capacity controls were relaxed from the 50/50 actual practice in
bilateral agreements to 55/45 and then two years later they became automatically 60/40. The
provisions on the basis of which air fares had to be approved when a carrier could demonstrate that
they were reasonable in the light of its own costs were maintained. Further liberalization was
introduced by way of two flexibility zones for promotional fares (basically PEX and APEX) within
which approval was automatic. Binding arbitration and right of matching were also introduced. With
regard to the rules against anti-competitive behavior of the Rome Treaty, regulations of application
were adopted in order to permit their effective enforcement in the air transport sector.
This package did give rise to considerable increases in activity for regional air carriers (the
period of double digit growth started) but the traffic between the big centers was not touched. It
was very important that we succeeded in using Regulations rather than Directives from this
point on since these legal instruments have direct effect in the Member States while Directives
need to be converted into national legislation. This not only saved time but also created a much
greater legal certainty.
Second Package
Since the time of the First Package the Community developed the whole idea of the internal market as
inspired by President Delors. When comparing the first package to this idea it was found that the First
Package was too limited. In contrast to the Directors General of civil aviation the Ministers of
transport increasingly became convinced that air transport as an economic sector would be a natural
candidate for the application of this idea. Agreement was reached in 1990 to take further measures of
liberalization and to finish the process by 1992. Before this agreement in 1990 there had been no
official policy that liberalisation had to go the whole way in a gradual manner.
The second package itself opened up market access for all airports (except in two regions) for 3rd, 4th
and 5th freedom services. Capacity limitations were relaxed to at least 60/40. Provisions were included
allowing for a further automatic gradual relaxation of capacity limits where the existing bilateral
capacity already were more liberal than 60%.
The principle of cost-relatedness for air fares for individual carriers was maintained. The zones for
automatic approval of promotional fares were expanded. A zone for double disapproval of the lowest
fully flexible fare was introduced. The right to match fares was kept.
The restrictions on (consecutive) fifth freedom services as well as traffic thresholds for multiple
designation were relaxed. The possibility for Member States domestically to establish a public service
obligation was introduced for situations where market forces could not function adequately. The
possibility to stabilize capacity in cases of serious economic difficulties was maintained and so were
the rules concerning airport congestion and operating provisions. An obligation to disapprove
excessive fares was introduced.
This package was generally considered to be rather disappointing and weak. I do not think so
since for the first time it looked at the whole Community air transport market for scheduled air
services including the big markets between the main airports. It stipulated that a final
liberalisation would have to come into existance by 1992. The package itself eliminated capacity
and air fare restrictions. It was on the basis of this package that the low cost air carriers began
to develop. While the growth rates of regional air carriers continued the high rates with the
second package the growth rates on the main routes began to increase significantly.
Air cargo
A Regulation of 1991 liberalized the air cargo market except for domestic air services and right of
establishment. It might therefore be said that with this decision by the Council point 2 of the priority
list from 1978 had been given attention.
The Regulation did not have much influence on market developments since the third package
followed so rapidly. It served to prepare the air cargo carriers but most of all it showed how an
air cargo liberalisation could be achieved without at the same time liberalising passenger air
transport.
C. Present measures
Third package
The third package was approved in 1992 and entered into effect January first 1993. It created an
economic regulatory framework for a common air transport market based on the freedom to provide
air services. This package has replaced all the above mentioned measures. It was being resisted by a
number of the big national air carriers but they were too late since the decision to liberalise fully had
in fact been taken in the context of the second package. Since the new legal measures were to cover all
air carriers and not just scheduled air carriers some resistance was encountered from the charter air
carriers because they were afraid that the new rules would be less liberal than the existing situation for
them. This resistance fell away when it became clear that the charter air carriers would also experience
increased liberalisation.
On the basis of the new provisions, a Community person (an individual or a company) irrespective of
his Community Nationality can create an air carrier anywhere within the Community. A Community
Air Carrier has the right to operate wherever opportunities might exist within the single market5. The
distinction between scheduled and non-scheduled air services has practically been eliminated in a
regulatory sense in particular for the licensing of air carriers and access to the market. The
discretionary powers of Member States in respect of their own air carriers were eliminated.
This means that it is up to the air carriers themselves to decide in which mode they will operate. Air
carriers are able to set prices freely and decide on the amount of capacity that they want to offer in the
market. In other words the third package has given Community air carriers commercial freedom.
The competition rules continue to apply so that useful types of co-operation are permitted but cartels
and other agreements of that nature as well as abuse of dominant positions are forbidden. The
Community in particular pays close attention to the possibility of predatory behavior and should be
able to stop serious cases of that nature. State aids are to be avoided except in a number of instances
where they are considered to be in the common interest.
 A number of safeguards and conditions were introduced or maintained. Operating licenses can not be
granted unless the air carriers concerned demonstrate to their competent authorities that they are
financially fit. These licenses may also be revoked or suspended when the air carriers are unable to
meet their actual and potential obligations. An insurance to cover liability in case of accidents is
compulsory. Safety standards should be ensured. When the market mechanisms do not result in needed
services for example to peripheral regions possibilities exist to impose public service obligations.
However, any exclusive concession which might result from this will have to be given on the basis of
a competitive process, namely a tendering procedure, in which air carriers from the whole of the EU
can participate. Where overcapacity has created serious economic difficulties for scheduled carriers of
a given Member State, the capacity to and from that State can be stabilized for a limited period. Fares
decreases can be stopped when they have resulted in wide spread losses among all carriers for the
services concerned.
Accompanying measures
It was found necessary to take a number of actions leveling the playing field for the operators.
Normally CRS rules are mentioned as part of consumer protection but there are also quite a few
concerns of air carriers in the context of CRSs. Air carriers need to be present in the CRSs and to have
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their products presented in a non-discriminatory way compared to their competitors. It is also useful to
have competition between the systems so that fees are not unreasonable. Whether or not there is
competition among air carriers the consumers are interested in having the services presented which are
closest to their desiderata be that in respect of schedules or price. The presentation must be as
comprehensive as possible and truthful. For all these reasons a code of conduct for CRSs was
developed in 1989 and revised in 1993 and 1999. The code ensures non-discrimination and equal
rights of access to the services of the CRSs for air carriers and travel agents. For the consumers the
code prescribes a neutral and comprehensive display.
In order to avoid that congestion at airports and in the airspace becomes a bottle-neck blocking the
practical effects of the liberalization process, the Union has dealt with the issue of physical access to
the infrastructure. Thus, a regulation on slot allocation was also decided in the beginning of 1993
which acknowledges existing "grandfather" rights and ensures that allocation is based on neutral,
transparent and non-discriminatory rules.
The framework of the third package with accompanying measures has produced a great deal of
development in the sector both in respect of growth and creation of reasonable air fares. It was
remarkable to see Lufthansa introduce new low fares on January 1 1993 in order to fill seats,
which would normally have been flown empty in the first part of 1993. This initiative by
Lufthansa caught all the other air carriers flatfooted and made it very clear to everybody that a
new market situation had come into existence. The regional air carriers have used the new
framework most efficiently and they have as a consequence for many years achieved double digit
growth. This is contrary to the US where deregulation led to a decline in regional (commuter)
air services and then to the hub system for the big air carriers. In the EU regional services were
stimulated from the beginning and this momentum has endured until today. The large EU Air
Carriers have also enjoyed larger than normal growth rates i.e. 8-9% instead of the 5%
predicted. The charter market has maintained its strength in the EU while it continues to be
weak in the US. Air fares have come down but not uniformly so. The use of promotional air
fares has increased substantially while normal air fares have only come down where competition
exists. Low cost air carriers have taken root and are now in the process of developing networks
which with time, I think, will cover the whole of the EU. Contrary to the US no real
consolidation has taken place but, as seen below, there is a reason for that.
D. Concerns
The third package etc. has created a liberalised market framework in the EU. The concerns which I
would like to mention relate to the possibility to maintain this competitive market in real life.
Alliances & mergers
The development of alliances and groupings has taken on a life of it’s own unfortunately to the extent
that competition largely has been eliminated in parts of the Community market. This is true for the big
alliances but also for the smaller ones. I think that the laxity of the US authorities when it came to
approval of mergers also influenced the approach in Europe at least in the beginning. Unfortunately
perhaps the first big merger in Europe took place in the most competitive national aviation market
namely the UK. This development started in the EU with the approval by the Commission of the
merger between British Caledonian and British Airways. The Commission approved this merger
although it was clear that it would lead to a sharp reduction in competition. It is true that British
Caledonian was close to bankruptcy but a competing offer did exist from SAS and that combination
would have if anything increased competition. In retrospect this made it difficult for the Commission
to say no to the merger between Air France, Air Inter and UTA and other mergers. This activity
concerning mergers has been followed by alliances. The Commission also in this context is in a weak
position because it can say no but it cannot indicate what it would be willing to accept. This is
unfortunate because on the one hand it is quite clear that European aviation needs to consolidate in
order to be competitive with the huge US air carriers. On the other hand elimination of competition
should not be allowed. An illustration of this dilemma can be found in the situation surrounding
Austrian Airlines. With this air carrier joining the STAR alliance the quasi elimination of competition
in a part of the EU market will be reinforced. If Austrian had joined another grouping such as One
World, Skyteam or Wings it would have got the necessary boost in the market while competition
would have been better preserved. The recent action of the Commission against SAS and Mærsk Air is
encouraging.
This development towards elimination of competition is reinforced by the so-called code-sharing
agreements6. Code-sharing in itself is probably not too bad but a code-sharing agreement contains
other elements in particular pool agreements which are not acceptable in many situations and which
were specifically singled out by Commissioner Sutherland in the eighties as absolutely contrary to the
competition rules. In this respect it should also be noted that code sharing agreements exist between
air carriers in different groupings thereby reducing the competitive element between these groups.
Until now the Commission has not taken any action against code-sharing. This is not good because
there is an enormous number of such agreements which in many cases eliminate competition in a
smaller or more substantial part of the market. Sooner rather than later action will have to be taken
against many of these agreements. It should be noted that the socalled blocked space agreements with
separate financial responsibility does maintain the competitive element.
It would be useful if users of all kinds would take part in this discussion and indicate to the
Commission that they are concerned. Complaints by users to the Commission are also possible.
FFP
The development outlined under alliances and mergers is accentuated by the use of FFPs, which give
the big carriers and their alliances an extra weapon in the competition. It is very difficult for small air
carriers to devise a competitive incentive. In fact a number of air carriers have been forced to enter an
alliance in order to gain access to a competitive FFP. The example of Sun-Air is illuminating. Such
incentive programs are normal in many economic sectors but they may have an excessive effect in air
transport especially if combined with codesharing agreements. Taxation of such employee benefits,
when the ticket is paid for by the employer, would reduce some of this disadvantage. However, it is
difficult to introduce such a scheme with effect for all air carriers. It is likely that only the national air
carrier would be hit. This would be unfair in the competition with the other air carriers in the
worldwide market. Perhaps it is because of this difficulty that taxation until now has only been tried in
very few cases and should not be tried unless the difficulty can be eliminated.
The combination of codesharing and FFP can be used in a predatory manner. This becomes
dangerous because it can make it possible for a group of airlines to eliminate real competition in
a substantial part of the market. On the other hand it should not lead to a situation where
general economic regulation is introduced. I have no doubt that the dangers of combining FFPs
with code sharing can be used by some countries as a pretext to reintroduce regulation (to
protect their own air carrier). The competition rules constitute the main and appropriate
instrument to deal with these concerns. However, normal market behaviour should not be
excluded. Negotiated fares are normal in the market and not only for air transport. If an express
service buys a large number of Mercedes vans it gets a substantial rebate. I see no reason why
such behaviour should be excluded in air transport. There is also reason to warn that
government ownership of air carriers should not lead to a relaxation of the application of the
competition rules.
Congestion
Increasing congestion was recognised as a problem in 1992/93 and slot allocation was formally
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introduced. These congestion problems have increased substantially since then since the policy of
liberalisation has led to sharply increased growth.
The present slot allocation system is based on the preservation of the socalled Grandfatherrights and
only new or unused slots are available to new or increased activity by other air carriers. I believe that
we will soon have to decide whether we will continue with the present system which protects the
existing air carriers or introduce new procedures which might either be in the nature of a rationing
system or based on market forces. I am basically sceptical about rationing since it would seem to
involve public authorities in secondguessing market needs. I will therefore limit the following remarks
to the introduction of a market mechanism.
Market mechanisms are applied in the US by virtue of a buy and sell rule. This has increased market
domination at some of the main airports in the US. Perhaps this is unavoidable but it is clear that a
number of weaknesses exist in the US i.e. no transparency and no guarantee that slots will not simply
move from an air carrier to its good (not competing) friends. This argues in favour of a system where
slots may have a price either directly or by way of an auction. This then further leads to the question
who will get the revenue from such pricing. In the US the air carriers are considered as owners of the
slots once they have been allocated and the revenue of any sales stay with the air carriers. In Europe
the airports considers themselves to be the providers of the infrastructure and therefore also the normal
recipients of revenue from slot sales. However, it might be argued that airports as recipients of revenue
from slot sales would be tempted to maintain capacity at a minimum and not construct new capacity
which would eliminate or reduce significantly the revenue from slot sales. Furthermore, under
international rules (ICAO7) airport fees must be cost related. Any revenue from slot sales would
therefore have to be used to reduce other airport fees. This would be contrary to the whole purpose of
introducing a pricing system for slots which is really to encourage some air carriers to reduce their
activity at the airport, to use larger aircraft or to move to another less congested airport.
A secondary question then becomes whether the market alone should decide which type of air carrier
should have to leave an airport. It is clear that the air carriers which can best afford to pay for slots are
the long haul scheduled air carriers because airport costs constitute a rather low percentage of their
total costs. They would therefore tend to squeeze out in particular regional air carriers. But some
regional air services might be needed to get to the main airport. For this reason a straight market based
system might have to be modified so as to establish a pricing system for the different types of traffic or
it might be necessary to constitute two or more slot pools for pricing or auctioning.
The internal market externally
While an internal market has been created for the Community in air transport it must be underlined
that it only covers transport between and within Member States. This has an unfortunate effect since
externally the Member States continue to negotiate bilaterally according to the classical model without
taking the Community internal air transport market into consideration. It means that cross-border
investments are not very attractive. For example Deutsche BA, in which British Airways has a
controlling shareholding, finds it very difficult to get traffic rights to third countries since it is not
owned and controlled by German nationals, which is required under the German bilateral agreements.
Part of the difficulties for Swissair can also be accounted for by this phenomenon since Swissair acted
too early i.e. before an air transport agreement with the EU had been ratified.
The Commission has taken legal action before the Court of Justice in order to try to resolve this
problem but today it is not known whether it will be successful.
Vulnerability is different for US and EU air carriers. US air carriers depend overwhelmingly on their
domestic home market and to them the international acitivities are a welcome but marginal bonus. For
the EU air carriers the international market is their bread and butter market. This weakness of EU air
carriers makes it tempting for Member States' governments to continue to protect their own air carriers
and not to allow EU air agreements with third countries in general. The effect of this is that needed
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consolidation in the EU is not taking place. This will remain so until the internal market is established
as a home market for the Community Air Carriers and the existance of the EU is recognised as such by
third countries in the context of air transport. In this regard government ownership constitute a barrier
to progress.
Conclusion
The basic philosophy in the beginning was arm twisting but it gradually changed to the liberal
philosophy of the internal market but there it stopped.
The benefits are not in doubt. Substantial decreases in most air fares, increase in choice, growth
of low cost air carriers and market based commercial behaviour. Badly managed air carriers,
which normally included government controlled air carriers, find life difficult. The resulting
growth of air transport has been substantial.
The challenge now is threefold. First of all there is a danger that protectionism may come in
through the back door and to counteract this the competition rules must be applied vigilantly,
secondly the international framework must be changed to accomodate the EU and thirdly
market mechanisms must be developed to cope with congestion problems.
This presentation has been of a socio-economic nature or psychohistory as Asimov would have
termed it. The reason is that straight economic arguments are not sufficient to explain what has
happened between 1978 and 1992 and will not be enough to explain the development of air
transport in the future either.
 Annex 1
GRADUAL DEVELOPMENT OF EU AIR TRANSPORT POLICY
      Interregional    1st pckge      2 pckge       cargo       3 pckge
                1983            1987          1990          1991        1992/93
 Geographical scope
Regional airports x x x x x
Regional/Main airports x x x x
Main airports x x x
Domestic x
Traffic Rights
Multiple Designation x x x x
3/4 freedom x x x x x
5 freedom           (x) (x) x x
6 freedom x x x x x
7 freedom x x
8 freedom x
9 freedom 1997
Public Service (x) x
Tariffs
Cost relatedness x x x (x)
Flexibility zones x x
Double disapproval (x)
Matching x x
Free pricing x x
Capacity
(60-40) x
60-40+ x
Free x x x
Air carrier licensing
Economic fitness x
Technical fitness x
Ownership x
Leasing rules x
      Interregional    1st pckge      2 pckge       cargo       3 pckge
                1983            1987          1990          1991        1992/93
Carrier rights
Against foreign state
tariffs x x x x x
capacity x x x x x
access x x x x x
licensing x
Against home state
tariffs x x x x x
capacity x x
access x
licensing x
Annex 2
Priority list for air transport approved by the Council in June 1978
1. Common standards restricting the emission of nuisances due to aircraft;
2. Simplification of formalities (facilitation), particularly those relating to air freight;
3. Implementation of technical standards (JAR);
4. Provisions regarding aids and competition;
5. Mutual recognition of licenses (aircrew and ground staff);
6. Working conditions (aircrew and ground staff);
7. Right of establishment
8. Possible improvements to inter-regional services;
9. Search, rescue and recovery operations, and accident enquiries.
